A Response to Lifetime President of Eritrea Isaias Afewerki's Remarks on Oromummaa

 

A Response to Lifetime President of Eritrea Isaias Afewerki's Remarks on Oromummaa

Isaias Afwerki’s rule is central to understanding Eritrea’s unique political trajectory. As the founding leader of independent Eritrea, he consolidated absolute power after the liberation war, systematically dismantling any prospects for democratic governance. Isaias has never allowed national elections, suspended the implementation of the constitution, and suppressed all forms of political pluralism. Under his leadership, Eritrea has become a highly militarized, surveillance-driven state where the lines between civilian and military life are blurred. The indefinite national service program—initiated under his orders—has been widely condemned as a form of forced labor and social control, designed not for national defense but to prevent youth mobilization or dissent. Isaias rules without institutional constraints, relying on a tight-knit security apparatus, secretive prisons, and the total absence of an independent press.

Regionally, Isaias positions himself as a power broker through a strategy of disruption rather than diplomacy. He has a long history of backing insurgent groups in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan not to help them advance their peoples' cause but to undermine adversaries and elevate Eritrea’s strategic relevance. His alliance with Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018 marked a sharp turn—from a decades-long enmity with the TPLF-led regime to a tactical partnership against mutual enemies, particularly the TPLF and later, the Oromo movement. 

Isaias’s recent rhetoric attacking "Oromummaa" reflects not a principled ideological position, but a continuation of his long-standing strategy: delegitimizing popular movements for autonomy or justice in neighboring states. During Eritrea’s 34th independence anniversary celebrations on Saturday, 24th of May 2025 President Isaias Afwerki delivered a speech that deserves close scrutiny—not for its visionary content, but for the troubling ideas it rehashed and the political messaging it sought to send across the region. We feel compelled to respond to two key aspects of his speech.

1. Mischaracterizing Oromummaa: A Tired and Dangerous Rhetoric

In one of his more pointed remarks, President Isaias Afwerki accused his former wartime ally, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, of promoting what he called an “Oromummaa ideology,” suggesting that it does not truly reflect the interests of the Oromo people. But this accusation is puzzling. Why fabricate a so-called “Oromummaa ideology” that neither exists in the form he describes nor aligns with the actual aspirations of the Oromo? Isaias, more than anyone, understands that Abiy is fundamentally an Ethiopianist leader. He dismantled the regional nationalist parties—including the rebranded but short-lived ODP, formerly the OPDO—and replaced them with a single, pan-Ethiopian party. This move signals a broader effort to suppress ethnic-based political expression and aligns closely with the ideology of groups like Ginbot 7, aimed at reviving Ethiopia’s imperial narrative. Ironically, this very vision is one Isaias has consistently advocated for Ethiopia since 1991—often in direct contradiction to the will of Ethiopia’s diverse peoples.

This claim is deeply problematic—both in substance and in intent.

● Oromummaa Is Not a Political Ideology

Let us be unequivocal: Oromummaa is not a political ideology, nor is it a tool of power politics. It is an expression of cultural identity, a collective consciousness rooted in the history, language, traditions, and values of the Oromo people regardless of political alignments. Simply put, Oromummaa is Oromoness, being an Oromo. Therefore, Oromummaa is no different from what it means to be identified as a Tigraway, Afar, Kunama, Somali, or Kikuyu. It is about being, not ruling.

Attempts to politicize, or criminalize or vilify Oromummaa come from two toxic political strands within Ethiopia’s imperial political narrative: 

First, from the Prosperity Party (PP) itself, which lost its legitimacy in Oromia after unilaterally dissolving the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) without the full consent of key leaders such as Lemma Megersa. By merging the ODP into a broader pan-Ethiopian entity, PP effectively silenced the Oromo’s distinct political voice within the government. 

Feeling abandoned by the Oromo public, the party then attempted to portray itself as representative of Oromo interests—illegally using the name Paartii Badhaadhinaa (a name never submitted to NEBE & not recognized at all) as if it were an Oromo-founded party with Oromo name. 

In addition, it continues to refer to its regional branch as a distinct party from the center mirroring the dissolved ODP as the Oromia Prosperity Party, despite violating its own internal rules and disregarding Ethiopia’s federal constitutional order. 

In a further bid to regain legitimacy, PP cadres and digital propagandists frequently label the regime as an “Oromo government,” cynically exploiting ethnic identity while betraying the fundamental aspirations of the Oromo and other indigenous peoples. This is deeply contradictory: while the Prosperity Party aggressively centralizes power and aligns itself with the policies of Ginbot 7 and EZEMA—both of which advocate for a pan-Ethiopian nationalist agenda—it simultaneously claims to represent Oromo interests. This dual strategy is inherently self-defeating and amounts to a calculated manipulation, aiming to secure Oromo support by undermining Oromummaa itself.

Second, from ultra-nationalist groups who cling to a centralist imperial vision, the very group enabled in all aspects by PM Abiy Ahmed. These factions push genocidal narratives against Oromo and other historically marginalized nations, insisting on a monolithic Ethiopian identity that suppresses cultural and linguistic diversity. For them, any expression of Oromo identity is a threat to their imagined hegemony.

President Isaias’ repetition of this rhetoric aligns him with Ethiopia's most reactionary elements and distances him from those genuinely committed to justice, pluralism, and federalism. In essence there is no leader like Abiy that fulfilled Isaias’ needs of weakening Ethiopia, by aborting the Democratic transition to a genuinely multinational federation.

These narratives by these toxic strands served the spoon-feeding role for Isaias. Ironically, Isaias unnecessarily quotes ‘Oromummaa ideology’, to criticize Abiy, who served his interest in Ethiopia while leading a country that lacks a unified national identity. Eritrea is a colonial construct, home to nine distinct nationalities—each with its own language, culture, and history. What unites them today is not a shared national project, but a common experience of repression under a lifetime dictatorship that functions without a constitution, an independent judiciary, or even a rubber-stamp parliament. He promised to turn Eritrea into the "Singapore of Africa," but instead delivered the "North Korea of Africa."

In this context, Isaias’ attack on Oromo identity appears not only hypocritical but also strategic.

● Why Isaias Fears a Federal Ethiopia

Isaias’ disdain for Oromummaa and Ethiopia’s multinational federalism stems from two calculated fears:

Firstly, Resource Exploitation Requires a Weak Ethiopia 

Eritrea benefited significantly from Ethiopia’s instability in the 1990s. Before the 1998–2000 Ethio-Eritrean war, Eritrea was among the top global coffee exporters—by channeling Ethiopian (Oromian, Sidama, Gedeo & Kaffa)) coffee through its ports. A weak, war-torn Ethiopia allows Isaias to exert influence and extract economic gains. This is why he supports a centralized Ethiopian regime that undermines federalism, as it perpetuates internal conflict and weakens national cohesion.

Secondly, Territorial Anxiety over Afar, Kunama, and Saho Regions 

A genuinely federal and democratic Ethiopia could inspire ethnic groups split by colonial borders—such as the Tigraway, the Afar, Kunama, and Saho—to reunite with their kin in Ethiopia. This poses a potential threat to Eritrea’s current territorial configuration. Isaias’ opposition to federalism is thus not ideological—it is existential.

While responding to Isaias’ remarks, equating Oromummaa with Eritrea's lack of cohesive national identity is a false equivalence and fundamentally flawed. The two represent entirely different historical and sociopolitical realities, making such a comparison illogical and misleading.

2. The Nobel Peace Prize and the War Pact Against Tigray

Another revealing part of the president’s speech was his veiled reference to the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Prime Minister Abiy. Isaias hinted—perhaps inadvertently—at what many observers have long suspected: that the peace deal between Eritrea and Ethiopia was never about lasting peace, but rather a tactical war pact aimed at dismantling a common adversary—the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), that costed the people of Tigray

This unholy alliance, forged not through careful diplomacy but through shared animosity, derailed Ethiopia’s democratic transition. Oromo political leaders and intellectuals—many of whom had a long-standing working relationship with Eritrean actors—had pleaded for a more inclusive, negotiated roadmap for transition to democratic federalism. Their voices were not ignored but silenced by mass killings, mass arrests, and inhuman treatments, particularly starting June 30, 2020.

Power was consolidated in the hands of a single man leader surrounded by Ginbot-7-EZEMA, Derg/monarch urban-centric remnant and co-opted Oromo veteran palace advisors, with Eritrea lending full-throated support. The result was not peace, but war—and the region has been paying the price ever since.

What We Said Then, Holds True Today

In 2020, when PP, Fano and Shabia joined hands to fight against TPLF we wrote on Facebook translated as:

“The Oromo people will not wage a war they have already won through peaceful means. Why relaunch a campaign against a foe that no longer poses the same threat? The true adversary of the Oromo is not the TPLF but the Prosperity Party itself. While PP and TPLF clash as former masters and subordinates, the PP is mounting its final offensive against Oromo self-determination—deploying a web of manipulated alliances both inside and outside Ethiopia to isolate and suppress Oromo voices.”

That diagnosis remains spot-on. As global attention fixated on the PP–TPLF showdown, the fundamental struggle—for genuine self-determination of the Oromo Nation—unfolded in Oromia and persists today. The Oromo will not be sidetracked by Abiy’s alliances; their focus lies firmly on confronting systemic othering agenda by Ethiopian state against Oromo identity, Oromummaa.

His speech simply affirms what many have long understood: the alliance between Isaias Afwerki and Abiy Ahmed was never grounded in a pursuit of peace or federal cohesion. It was a calculated partnership forged to eliminate perceived threats—starting with the TPLF, followed by the Oromo movement, and now targeting any aspiration for a truly inclusive and pluralistic Ethiopia.

That’s why Isaias’ references to “Oromummaa ideology,” Kush-Semitic narratives, and other ideological posturing sound hollow. These are not principled arguments but instruments in a broader counterrevolutionary campaign—one that Abiy has been waging against the Oromo struggle for self-determination and democratic transformation since at least 2020.

The Oromo Cause Remains Distinct and Uncompromised. 

It is not interested in aligning with Abiy, Isaias, or any other authoritarian force. Its goal is the unfinished struggle for self-determination, justice, and an inclusive federal order—rooted in respect for all nations and nationalities. No imperial nostalgia or war pact can erase that. The fight for freedom in Oromia continues—not against ghosts of the past, but against the very real and present machinery of repression.

A Final Word: The Horn Is at a Crossroads

Whenever President Isaias Afwerki and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed align themselves with any group or entity, it often signals not genuine reconciliation but a war pact against another. The 2018 agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, hailed globally as a peace breakthrough and celebrated with a Nobel Peace Prize for Abiy, was, in truth, a tactical military alliance—one that paved the way for the devastating war on Tigray, waged by Abiy’s federal forces in collaboration with Eritrean troops and Amhara Fano militias.

This deceptive pact, which misled much of the world, has since been replaced by the 2022 Pretoria Peace Agreement between Abiy’s Prosperity Party (PP) and the TPLF. However, this agreement—intended to end the war in Tigray—has itself become a new flashpoint. By 2023, the deal had contributed to a full-blown conflict in the Amhara region, transforming Abiy’s former ally Fano into fierce adversaries.

Prime Minister Abiy has reportedly interpreted the Pretoria Agreement as a strategic move to neutralize Eritrea’s influence. His outreach to the TPLF is widely seen not as a gesture of reconciliation but as a call for alliance against Isaias, in pursuit of his controversial and undiplomatic ambition to secure sea access through Eritrean territory.

President Isaias, for his part, has made clear in his most recent Independence Day speech what many feared: that tensions in the Horn of Africa are rising again, and that old fault lines are being exploited for short-term gain. His rhetoric—including pointed remarks about “Oromummaa”—underscores that both he and Abiy now perceive the deal not as a foundation for peace but as yet another tactical war pact—this time possibly directed at each other.

The region stands at a dangerous crossroads. Tensions are once again rising in the Horn of Africa. Old fault lines are being exploited for short-term strategic gains, and the consequences could be catastrophic. Ethiopia, already embroiled in ongoing wars in Oromia and Amhara, cannot afford further escalation—let alone a regional conflict involving Eritrea and neighboring states.

All stakeholders—within Ethiopia, the Horn, and the broader international community—must act with urgency, responsibility, and clarity of purpose. The U.S. Embassy in Finfinne and in Asmara rightly emphasized the need for lasting peace and peaceful conflict resolution. This advice must be heeded.

Ultimately, the people of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the wider Horn of Africa deserve a future founded on dignity, dialogue, and democratic self-rule—not one shaped by authoritarian leaders who conflate unity with uniformity and strength with repression but arrangement addressing the unfinished state formations in the region.

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